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Following the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR), the Russian Federation remains an energy 
superpower. However, in the 1990s the country experienced a 
decade of instability and decline during which its international 
influence and, more troubling for Russia, regional influence 
declined. The dissolution of the USSR also coincided with 
surplus crude oil on the world market in combination with price 
stability and suppression. Consequently, energy became less 
prominent as a traditional Russian tool of influence. This 
occurred in conjunction with the Russian state’s loss of control 
over the country’s energy sector. 
From 2000, Russia began to regain global and, more 
importantly, regional influence with President Putin’s rise to 
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power, recovering oil prices from 1998 (in a new cycle 
characterised by excess demand), and the start of the Second 
Gulf War. Two decades later, it is claimed that “the Russian 
foreign and security policy framework is characterised by a 
regional power that is striving to reacquire the global power it 
enjoyed during the Soviet era” (translated from Marquina 
2012, 6). 
Russia’s energy policy is the cornerstone upon which this 
recovery rests. It has two interrelated functions: an internal 
function, which essentially involves the practice of “energy 
nationalism”, and an external function (the focus of this 
article), which concerns Russian influence in three regions: 
post-Soviet Europe, Central Asia and the South Caucasus. 
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The dismemberment of the Soviet Union prompted a very unstable decade of decline for Russia, and generated numerous conflicts in the 
post-Soviet space. Russia regained influence at global and, chiefly, regional level from 2000, after Vladimir Putin became president and the 
price of hydrocarbons rose. Arguably, energy policy played an essential role. The South Caucasus, where three secessionist conflicts took 
place, leading to Russian political, diplomatic and military intervention, was crucial for the Russian geo-energy interests. This article examines 
and discusses the impact of intervention on Russian geo-energy interests, in particular since Putin came to power. The working hypothesis 
proposes that Russia’s involvement in the three secessionist conflicts in the South Caucasus has considerably benefited the many Russian 
geo-energy interests. 
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These regions compose Russia’s “near abroad” or “sphere of 
influence” and include the fourteen former Soviet republics. 
The term South Caucasus is politically neutral and more 
geographically accurate than Transcaucasia. The term in its 
classical sense refers to the region formed by Georgia, Armenia 
and Azerbaijan, former Soviet republics that became 
independent states in 1991. 
Historically, the South Caucasus has been vital to Russian 
national interests. For two centuries, Georgia, Azerbaijan and 
Armenia were part of the Tsarist Empire and then the USSR. 
Russia’s post-Soviet relations with the South Caucasus have 
been heavily influenced by its geo-energy interests and 
intervention in unresolved secessionist conflicts in South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia (Georgia) and Nagorno-Karabakh 
(Armenia/Azerbaijan). These are recognised as “frozen 
conflicts”, territorial and ethnic disputes arising after the 
disintegration of the USSR that create multiple risks and 
threats. The Russian-Georgian war of 2008 demonstrated the 
fragility of the security system in this region and in nearby 
states (Novikova 2012, 550–51). 
Although there are many unresolved territorial tensions in the 
South Caucasus (for example, Adjara or Samtskhe-Javakheti 
in Georgia, Nakhichevan in Azerbaijan), the conflicts over 
South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh have a 
secessionist character, where de facto independent territories 
have emerged out of armed conflicts, although without 
international recognition. In the context of Russian energy 
policy, one central strategy adopted to obtain geo-energy 
benefits in the post-Soviet South Caucasus has involved 
intervening in these conflicts politically, economically and 
militarily. In turn, expanding Russia’s regional influence (the 
traditional goal of its foreign policy) necessitates the 
implementation of this energy policy. Hence, this strategy 
reinforces itself. 
Over the last two decades, researchers have discussed this 
strategy and analysed conflict in the post-Soviet South 
Caucasus (Fall 2006; Hewitt 2001; Hoesli 2006; Lacoste 
1996; Novikova 2012; Taibo 2004, 2006; Thual 2001; Van 
der Leeuw 1998; Yakemtchouk 1999). However, while the 
South Caucasus is central to Russian geo-energy interests, and 
although Russia’s intervention in such conflicts is evident, two 
areas for improvement have been detected in the literature, 
including literature focusing on energy issues (Ashour 2004; 
Blank 1999; Ebel and Menon 2000; Olcott 1999; Rachinskiy 
et al. 2007; Van der Leeuw 2000). 
First, a direct, specific and clear connection in terms of 
concrete benefits is missing between Russia’s intervention in 
the three secessionist conflicts in the South Caucasus and the 
defence of Russian geo-energy interests. Second, a 
comprehensive and organised presentation of such benefits 
has not been accomplished, particularly since Putin’s rise to 
power. This article aims to address these limitations. 
The following question summarises the research problem: 
How has Russian intervention in the three post-Soviet 
secessionist conflicts in the South Caucasus affected Russian 
geo-energy interests? Our hypothesis is that Russia’s 
intervention in the three post-Soviet secessionist conflicts in 
the South Caucasus has greatly benefited its geo-energy 
interests. 
 
1. Post-Soviet Russia’s Geo-energy Interests and Regional 
Influence: The Importance of the South Caucasus 
Russia is a quintessential energy superpower. The country is 
self-sufficient in energy, and its immense energy resources 
represent one of its main geopolitical strengths. This article 
focuses on oil and gas resources. Fossil fuels dominate the 
global energy mix, and remain this century’s main energy 
supply (International Energy Agency 2013, 1–2). 
Russia alternates with Saudi Arabia as the main global oil 
producer and with Iran as the country with the largest proven 
gas reserves (Oil and Gas Journal 2013). Russia may also 
possess the largest reserves of shale oil, and has the ninth-
largest reserves of shale gas (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration/Advanced Resources International 2013, 6). 
Russia supplies Europe with approximately one-third of its oil 
and gas needs and increasingly supplies oil to East Asia. 
Approximately 50 percent of the state’s revenues come from 
energy, but “the energy sector is far more than a commercial 
asset for Moscow; it has been one of the pillars of Russia’s 
stabilisation and increasing strength for more than a century” 
(Goodrich and Lanthemann 2013, 1). Moreover, even though 
the “instrumentalisation of power for political purposes is a 
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well-known strategy in Russia [...] and goes back to Soviet 
times [...], with Putin’s arrival to power, a policy was 
established to restore Russia’s influence – increase its power 
– in neighbouring regions but also beyond. It is also the case 
that this has been based on its energy capacity” (translated 
from Sánchez Ortega 2014, 234). 
Russia’s energy policy possesses the two features described. 
Domestically, Russia has practiced energy nationalism, which 
is also practiced in Venezuela and Algeria (Mañé 2006). This 
has been accompanied by highly coercive measures focussing 
on control of pipelines, and by the expeditious and opaque 
nature of Russian approaches to political power (Politkovskaya 
2005, 2007, 2011). The state has asserted control over 
virtually the entire Russian gas sector through its state-owned 
monopoly Gazprom, and since 2003 the oil sector has 
undergone a process of disguised renationalisation through 
the creation of state-owned companies (Rosneft and 
Gazpromneft) and state-linked private companies (Lukoil, TNK-
BP and Surgutneftegaz) (Hanson 2009; Pirani 2010). 
With respect to external energy policies, Russia has 
manipulated energy to alter the balance of power in 
neighbouring regions: post-Soviet Europe, Central Asia and the 
South Caucasus. Russia has maintained its dominant position 
in the European market, the dependency on former European 
Soviet republics, and control over pipeline systems that run 
from post-Soviet Europe to Western Europe. Similarly, it has 
managed to maintain its position as the main export route for 
oil and gas from Central Asia. 
However, it is precisely in the South Caucasus, and 
particularly in Georgia, that Russia’s strategy may be most 
threatened. The South Caucasus, a globally significant 
geopolitical and geostrategic region, is bordered to the north 
by the troubled North Caucasus (Russia); to the south by 
Turkey and Iran (Russia’s rivals for influence over the South 
Caucasus); to the west by the Black Sea; and to the east by 
the Caspian Sea. As highlighted by Batalla (2009, 3): “the 
Caucasus, the backyard of the Tsars, whether white or red, is 
considered by Vladimir Putin’s Russia as the sphere of 
influence that will again make Russia great in a global context”. 
Additionally, the South Caucasus is particularly relevant within 
the Caucasus as a whole, given its critical geo-energy 
importance. The region is of great interest to Russia for two 
fundamental reasons: 
 
a) The region is very rich in proven hydrocarbon reserves, but 
these reserves are distributed unevenly. According to the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, in May 2013 Azerbaijan’s 
proven reserves were 7 billion barrels of oil (bbl) and 35 trillion 
cubic feet (cf) of gas, while Georgia possessed 40 million bbl 
and 300,000 million cf, respectively. Azerbaijan produced 
921,750 bbl per day (bbl/d) (20th in world rankings) and 
606,560 million cf of gas annually (30th). Georgia produced 
1,000 bbl/d and 200 million cf of gas annually but is a net 
importer of oil and gas (fulfilling its gas needs largely from from 
Azerbaijan). For its part, Armenia, which is devoid of 
hydrocarbon assets, buys nearly 100 percent of its 
domestically consumed gas and oil from Russia (2.1 billion 
cubic meters (cm) and 50,000 bbl/d in 2013 (Central 
Intelligence Agency 2014). 
 
b) The existence of these reserves and the pipeline system 
built during the Soviet period, which runs from the Caspian Sea 
to the Black Sea, in addition to recent geopolitical conflicts, 
continue to encourage major investments in pipeline-building 
and maintenance (Morales Hernández 2004, 2). This trend will 
become even more prominent as production grows, as in the 
case of the Caspian Shah Deniz gas fields (I and II), 
Azerbaijan’s largest deposit. 
 
The South Caucasus is crossed by four strategic pipelines 
that are primarily directed towards Europe: three oil pipelines 
and one gas pipeline. Given its presence in the South 
Caucasus, this infrastructure provides Russia with an 
instrument for exerting pressure over the West. However, the 
gas pipeline and two of the three oil pipelines are owned and 
operated by Western companies and do not cross Russian 
territory, enabling the export of Azerbaijani resources and thus 
allowing Georgia to mitigate its energy dependence on Russia. 
Hence, Russia has a strong interest in maintaining and 
strengthening its influence in the South Caucasus, and 
particularly in Georgia, and in opposing the construction of 
offshore pipelines through the Caspian Sea so that extracted 
IJCV: Vol. 11#03/2017 
Peña-Ramos: The Impact of Russian Intervention in Post-Soviet Secessionist Conflict in the South Caucasus on Russian Geo-energy Interests 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
resources are transported by land (shipping by LNG tankers is 
extremely expensive). 
 
The four strategic pipelines are: 
 
a) The Baku-Novorossiysk Oil Pipeline completed in 1996, 
which can transport up to 105,000 bbl/d over 1,330 
kilometres from Azerbaijan to the Russian oil terminal of 
Novorossiysk (on the Black Sea). 
 
b) The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Main Export Oil Pipeline (BTC oil 
pipeline), which was built to rival the Baku-Novorossiysk 
pipeline and took advantage of Russia’s weak state in the 
1990s. Also completed in 2006, it can transport up to one 
million bbl/d of crude oil from the Caspian Sea to the 
Mediterranean and from there to Europe in oil tankers. The 
pipeline is 1,768 kilometres long, crossing Azerbaijan, Georgia 
and Turkey. Although companies involved in its construction 
considered other, more efficient routes, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Turkey and especially the United States asserted domestic 
interests to select this final route. 
 
c) The Western Route Export Pipeline (WREP) completed in 
1999 transports crude oil from the Caspian Sea to the Black 
Sea and from there in oil tankers to Europe. over . The 829-
kilometre route begins in Azerbaijan, crosses Georgia, and 
terminates at the Supsa Terminal in Georgia. 
 
d) The Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Gas Pipeline (BTE gas pipeline) 
completed in 2007 can transport up to 20,000 million cm of 
gas annually 980 kilometres from the Caspian Sea to Erzurum, 
Turkey, following the same route as the BTC oil pipeline. The 
BTE gas pipeline may in future connect with Turkmenistan via 
the offshore Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) pipeline 
project. 
 
In this sense, the South Caucasus, and Azerbaijan in 
particular, represents a potential corridor to Central Asia and 
East Asia. In fact, the West urges the South Caucasus to host 
pipeline projects that may in the future form a Fourth Corridor, 
which would be designed to reduce dependence on Russian 
gas and gas pipelines importing Azerbaijani gas and Turkmen 
and Kazakh gas through pipelines that cross the Caspian Sea 
and continue through Azerbaijan and Georgia towards Europe. 
However, in order to accomplish this, Russia (and, to a lesser 
degree, Iran) would need to unblock the building of offshore 
pipelines in the Caspian Sea, which is highly unlikely, as this 
would contradict Russian geo-energy interests (for Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea is a lake, but 
for Russia and Iran, it is an inland sea). Pipeline-building would 
thus require an agreement between the five countries that 
likely would not include Russia, which is interested in operating 
pipelines that cross its own territory. 
As part of Fourth Corridor framework, various gas pipeline 
projects involving different routes and destinations have been 
proposed, with Azerbaijan and the European Union favouring 
some more than others: Nabucco, the South-East Europe 
Pipeline (SEEP), the Turkey-Greece-Italy Interconnector (ITGI), 
the White Stream and the currently most viable Trans Adriatic 
Pipeline (TAP), initially proposed by the United States and led 
by British Petroleum and the State Oil Company of the 
Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR). 
The oldest and most ambitious and expensive proposal is 
the Nabucco project, which would initially connect Erzurum 
with Austria but could then be connected to the BTE gas 
pipeline and thus Turkmenistan and Iran (which is building a 
gas pipeline close to its borders with Turkey, Azerbaijan and 
Armenia). Russia prefers Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to sell 
gas to Russia, as demonstrated by President Medvedev, who 
attempted to persuade his two counterparts on this issue as 
one of his first foreign policy actions. 
Currently, however, the Nabucco project is still infeasible, 
mainly due to doubts surrounding the availability of sufficient 
Azerbaijani gas. This requirement also implies that only smaller 
projects connected to Azerbaijan are viable within the Fourth 
Corridor: TAP and perhaps SEEP, a smaller version of Nabucco. 
The plan is also impractical at present for geopolitical reasons 
and due to a lack of strong EU support; the existence of the 
rival Russian South Stream project, which is highly advanced 
and will occupy the floor of the Black Sea; the project’s high 
cost; and the absence of a prominent Western company in 
upstream Turkmenistan to lobby for the deal. 
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The White Stream project is much less strategic, as it involves 
transporting gas through Ukraine and requires an expensive 
connection with Georgia via the Black Sea. Concerning ITGI 
and TAP – rival projects for gas transport to Greece and Italy – 
in 2013 the Greek crisis caused Azerbaijan and the consortium 
that operates Shah Deniz to select the TAP (which can 
transport 16 billion cm annually) for transporting gas to 
Europe. The first section of the TAP will run through Azerbaijan 
and Georgia, thus acting as an extension of the BTE gas 
pipeline, and will connect with a second section in Turkey: the 
Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP). This arrangement will finally 
provide a connection to Greece and Italy. 
 
2. Russian Intervention in the South Caucasus Conflicts: 
Geo-energy Benefits 
Currently, only Azerbaijan and Armenia are members of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS, Georgia left in 
2008), and only Armenia is a member of the Collective 
Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO, Azerbaijan and Georgia left 
in 1999). Although their relations are not free from tension, 
Armenia has traditionally acted as Russia’s stable and 
strategic partner in the South Caucasus for reasons that go 
beyond the mere fact that their populations are largely 
Christian and of Indo-European ethnicity. Armenia needs 
Russian troops to remain in its territory (where they have been 
since the Soviet era), and given Armenia’s inability to 
guarantee the security of its borders, Russian border guards 
monitor its borders with Turkey and especially Iran. 
Relations between Russia and Azerbaijan are conditioned by 
Azerbaijani energy capacities and the Armenian-Azerbaijani 
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Although Azerbaijan is not 
Russia’s partner, relations between the two countries have 
improved in recent years. Compared to Russian-Georgian 
relations, which broke down in 2008 following the war and 
Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, relations 
have changed only marginally. 
The present article does not intend to elaborate on the 
origins and development of the three conflicts but rather to 
explain Russian intervention and to show how Russia’s 
willingness and ability to intervene (citing, among other 
reasons, the need to protect Russian citizens, ethnic Russians 
and Russian speakers) have been favoured by certain 
characteristics of these conflicts and by regional and 
geopolitical dynamics. The three conflicts are polyhedral and 
operate within global geopolitics, as clearly exhibited by the 
presence of important stakeholders aside from Russia (the 
United States, the European Union, Turkey and Iran), whose 
interests have often collided (Askari and Taghavi 2006; Cornell 
2001; Demirbas 2010; Koolaee and Hafezian 2010). 
Each of the three conflicts possesses endogenous and 
exogenous components. All three have been defined in 
different ways since the late 1980s; initial designation as 
ethnic conflicts was followed by redesignation as ethno-
political and political-ethnic conflicts; some authors have also 
treated them as conflicts between states without ethnic 
motivations while others deem them territorial conflicts. As 
noted by Rusetsky (2012, 62), “the inadequate perception of 
the content and sociology of the conflicts is one of the basic 
and legally fundamental causes of their unsolvable nature”. 
The South-Caucasus Institute of Regional Security (SCIRS) 
(2014) argues that each conflict has followed the same 
evolutionary pattern and provides an understanding of how the 
conceptualisation and definition of these conflicts attracted 
Russian intervention, and the reason for the inability to reach 
satisfactory and definitive agreements – which benefits Russia. 
According to SCIRS, conflicts first arose between various 
parties. Next, parallel pseudo-conflicts emerged that 
deepened these conflicts by exacerbating, modifying or 
suppressing true motivations and incorporating players who 
were allegedly involved or interested in the conflicts (mainly 
Russia, Russian citizens and individuals of Russian origin or 
from Russian-speaking areas in conflict zones). Pseudo-
conflicts artificially fostered the ethnic component of political 
conflict and a resurgence of interest in the historical origins, 
thus ethnically essentialising these originally political conflicts. 
This fostered ethnic hatred and led to the third phase, in which 
actors that are actually contributing to the conflict (Russia in 
particular) are postulated as mediators and peacemakers 
between alleged rival ethnic or nationalist groups. 
Georgians, South Ossetians and Abkhazians are primarily, in 
ethnic terms, Georgians, Ossetians and Abkhazians, 
respectively (although most are Christian). Approximately 75 
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percent of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh is Christian 
and ethnically Armenian, while Azerbaijan is predominantly 
Muslim and ethnically Azeri. However, these differences alone 
do not explain the occurrence of conflict or the interests of 
these and other actors in perpetuating both the conflicts 
themselves and pseudo-conflicts in order to obtain benefits 
and achieve a standby or quasi-peace phase, which is nearly 
completely subordinate to Russia’s geo-energy interests. This 
quasi-peace inhibits the true resolution of real conflict and the 
materialisation of real peace. Consequently, as Alexander 
Rusetsky states: “the development paradigm of the Caucasian 
conflicts is oriented toward the side of the crisis and not toward 
the side of regulation” (2012, 62), as is shown in the following 
section. 
 
2.1. Georgia: South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
In 1990, the Georgian region of South Ossetia declared itself 
independent as the Republic of South Ossetia, to which the 
Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic responded by abolishing its 
autonomous status. In 1991, Georgia was recognised as an 
independent state, and territorial tensions heightened in South 
Ossetia. In January 1991, Georgian troops attempted to enter 
the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali and started a war in 
which Russia supported South Ossetian. The war ended with 
the defeat of Georgia and the signing of the Dagomis 
Agreements between Russia and Georgia in July 1992, which 
made Russia responsible for ensuring the security of both 
parties and established a security corridor through Georgia for 
Russian troops. 
After Abkhazia unilaterally declared itself an independent 
region of Georgia in September 1992, fighting erupted 
between Georgian troops and Russian-Abkhaz paramilitaries, 
which occupied much of Abkhazia, including the capital 
Sukhumi. The fighting persisted until 1993. In 1994, Russian 
peacekeepers were deployed, this time under the direction of 
the CIS (the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia, 
established in August 1993 to verify compliance with the 
ceasefire agreement between Georgia and Abkhazia. The 
mission ended in 2009, when the United Nations Security 
Council failed to reach a consensus on the issue). 
In 1992, the majority of South Ossetians (nearly 90 percent 
possess Russian citizenship) voted in favour of joining Russia, 
and this began to encourage secessionism and the delivery of 
aid and troops from North Ossetia (which is part of Russia). 
After 1995, tensions between Georgia and South Ossetia 
intensified with recurring clashes, and more fighting broke out 
in Abkhazia in 1998 and 2001. 
In 2006, a majority of South Ossetians voted for 
independence in a referendum deemed illegal by Georgia. In 
July of that year, the Georgian parliament called for an end to 
Russian peacekeeping operations in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia and for the replacement of Russian peacekeeping 
troops with international police contingents. The Georgian 
parliament considered the presence of Russian troops to be a 
major obstacle to a peaceful resolution and warned that the 
troops would be viewed as an occupying force if they refused 
to leave. In 2006, Georgian forces occupied Upper Abkhazia, 
and in 2007, Georgia created the Provisional Administrative 
Entity of South Ossetia. 
The independence of Kosovo in 2008, which Russia rejected, 
deepened Russia’s special bilateral relationships with South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia and its political and financial support of 
both regions. In April 2008, Putin announced that Russia 
would grant preferential treatment to both regions and act as 
a defender of the rights, freedoms and interests of their 
populations. Russia expanded social benefits for these 
populations (when Putin came to power in 2000 he began 
granting them passports to travel to Russia and receive 
Russian social benefits). 
Georgia, meanwhile, accused Russia of backing the 
breakaway regions and intending to grant Russian citizenship 
en masse to their inhabitants, thus “silently” annexing them. 
On the evening of 7 August 7 2008, Georgian troops invaded 
and bombed South Ossetia (Operation Clear Field, later 
considered by many to be a serious strategic error), which 
automatically provoked a Russian intervention in Georgia in 
defence of the two regions and the cessation of a similar 
Georgian operation in Abkhazia (Operation Rock). Russia, 
claiming to be conducting peaceful operations, responded 
militarily to Georgia and entered its first interstate conflict since 
Soviet times: the Russian-Georgian war of 8–12 August 2008. 
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Russia defeated Georgia and expelled Georgian forces from 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, with which it immediately 
established diplomatic relations and recognised as sovereign 
states. Russia maintains military bases with thousands of 
troops in both territories and claims that this action is justified 
by the need for peace operations, by the fact that the Russian 
legal system requires the defence of Russian citizens wherever 
they are, and by agreements signed with both territories for 
mutual assistance in cases of external aggression (de facto 
protectorates that Russia may annex at any time). This war 
established Russia as a prominent player in the South 
Caucasus. 
 
2.1.1. Geo-energy Benefits for Russia 
Russia’s intervention in secessionist conflicts in South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia, especially after the 2008 war, has 
brought it significant geo-energy benefits. Specifically, Russia 
has strengthened and increased its presence in Georgia, 
greatly weakening a state that is very refractory to Russian 
interests (at the same time, Russia has achieved it without 
friction with Azerbaijan, a country rich in energy resources). 
Georgia holds a key strategic position in South Caucasus 
energy corridors and provides the only real alternative to the 
Russian pipeline system for transporting oil and gas from the 
Caspian Sea and Central Asia. (No regional strategic pipeline 
passes through Armenia given strained Armenian-Azerbaijani 
relations due to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.) Even 
Russian gas that reaches Armenia is carried through a pipeline 
that runs through Georgia. 
Following the war of 2008, Russia acquired complete control 
over the Abkhaz coast to strengthen the already massive 
presence of its naval fleet in the Black Sea and to control the 
flow of hydrocarbons and the Abkhaz continental shelf and its 
deposits (in the long term), as well as to acquire significant 
income by signing contracts to build energy networks. To the 
detriment of the Caspian Sea area, Russia has managed to 
strengthen the Black Sea area in order to control strategic 
regional pipelines and block access to the Black Sea. It has 
also managed to exert more direct control over pipelines that 
connect Azerbaijan (including Nakhichevan, which is 
separated from the rest of the country by Armenia) with the 
South Caucasus, Russia, and Iran. 
Russia has also prevented the creation of new pipelines 
through the South Caucasus and Georgia avoiding Russian 
territory. In the war of 2008, Russia largely destroyed the 
Georgian army, which protected the oil pipelines, as well as 
the main commercial port (Poti), which included an oil terminal 
and which was crucial to the East-West corridor (only the Baku-
Novorossiysk Oil Pipeline was fully operational throughout the 
war, but Russia did not attack any pipeline to avoid alienating 
Azerbaijan and Turkey). Russia has also tightened its control 
over rail transport of oil in the South Caucasus (since the 
closure of the Abkhaz-Georgian border, Russian oil enters 
Georgia through the Black Sea and is transported to Armenia 
by rail). 
Similarly, to the detriment of the Caspian Sea area, Russia 
has managed to strengthen the Black Sea as a transport 
corridor to promote the advancement of its South Stream 
project. In 2009, Gazprom inaugurated the Dzuarikau-
Tskhinvali gas pipeline, which connects Russia and the South 
Ossetian capital. Russia has succeeded in forcing Kazakhstan 
to cancel major investments in energy infrastructure in Georgia 
and, despite US efforts, has prevented the planning of new 
pipelines to link Central Asia with the South Caucasus and the 
South Caucasus with Western countries avoiding Russian 
territory (Cohen 2009, 11). 
Hence, Russia has prevailed as the major transit corridor for 
current and future pipelines and resisted US and European 
efforts to ensure that essential import routes from Central Asia 
avoid Russian territory, and to and limit their dependence on 
Russia. Despite the importance of the South Caucasus to the 
West, this situation has been reinforced through the crisis in 
Ukraine, which is a vital source of EU gas imports via pipelines 
from Russia. 
These processes have prevented Georgia, an ally of the 
United States, from joining the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation. Even before the 2008 war, Germany and France 
vetoed Georgia’s accession, citing among other reasons the 
existence of such problems. In turn, Russia has distanced the 
South Caucasus from the United States (and from NATO), 
which possesses its own geo-energy interests in the region 
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(and from NATO). Finally, with the 2008 war, Russia indirectly 
warned those states with territorial tensions within its sphere 
of influence that collaborating with NATO or the EU could harm 
Russian geo-energy interests (underlined in 2014 by Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea). Furthermore, in recognising South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia as sovereign states, Russia indirectly 
informed Armenia and Azerbaijan that the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict will follow Russian interests and signalled Azerbaijan 
that Russia may also recognise Nagorno-Karabakh. 
 
2.2. Armenia-Azerbaijan: Nagorno-Karabakh 
In 1923, the USSR made Nagorno-Karabakh part of the 
Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. Shortly before the demise 
of the USSR, Armenia and Azerbaijan began to confront each 
other in this territory. In 1988, the Nagorno-Karabakh 
parliament sought reunification with Armenia. In 1990, there 
were massacres of Armenians in Azerbaijan and clashes 
between Azeri nationalists and Russian troops. In 1991, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh were declared 
sovereign states, and in 1991–1992, Azerbaijan attacked 
secessionists in Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia responded, and 
in 1993–1994 took control of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven 
surrounding Azerbaijani districts (approximately 20 percent of 
Azerbaijan). 
In 1993, Armenia belonged to the CSTO in the CIS 
framework, as did Azerbaijan (which left the CSTO in 1999). 
Although Russia was officially neutral in the conflict, it supplied 
arms to both sides. In May 1994, a ceasefire sponsored by 
Russia came into effect, although peace talks held since have 
failed to resolve the conflict (the Armenian-Azerbaijani border 
is the most militarised in the world and dozens die there 
annually, especially in sporadic sniper incidents). 
Armenia considers Nagorno-Karabakh an independent state 
that should be present in the peace talks of the OSCE Minsk 
Group, which is composed of Russia, the United States, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Sweden and Turkey. According to Azerbaijan, Armenia must 
withdraw from Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding Azerbaijani 
territories, and the return of refugees and displaced persons 
should be allowed. Azerbaijan maintains an economic 
embargo against Armenia, as does Turkey and Iran (in 
addition, Turkey traditionally maintains a hostile attitude 
towards Armenia). Lacking oil and gas resources and access 
to the sea, Armenia is thus dependent on having a powerful 
ally such as Russia to ensure its survival and national identity 
and to provide the population with a certain degree of welfare 
through state aid and Russian business investments. In 1997, 
Russia and Armenia signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation 
and Mutual Assistance. 
However, throughout the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Russia 
has not positioned itself against energy-rich Azerbaijan, which 
is strategically placed across energy corridors. Since 1991, 
Russia has attempted to maintain a calculated and complex 
balance between Armenia and Azerbaijan while favouring its 
own geo-energy interests. For example, Russia supplied 
weapons to both sides. On this issue, the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies (2010) stated that Russia was striking a 
new balance in its relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan. For 
example, after a meeting between President Medvedev and the 
Azerbaijani President in September 2010, to continue 
improving traditionally frosty relations between the two states, 
unofficial sources reported a significant delivery of Russian 
weaponry to Azerbaijan; however, Russian-Azerbaijani 
relations are not without residual tensions, as demonstrated in 
late 2012 by the failure of negotiations to renew the lease of 
Russia’s Liaki-2 radar station installed in Azerbaijan in 1985, 
after Russia rejected Azerbaijan’s conditions. 
However, in August 2010, Russia signed new military 
agreements with Armenia that have expanded the supply of 
Russian weapons and the direct involvement of Russian troops 
in support of Armenia’s security. Additionally, Armenia will 
allow Russia to keep its 102nd Military Base in Gyumri until 
2044 (established in 1995), which has acquired greater 
importance throughout the South Caucasus and which is 
regarded as a guarantee of Armenian security against 
Azerbaijan and Turkey. Using this strategy, Russia 
simultaneously pressured Azerbaijan and Armenia to cease 
hostilities over Nagorno-Karabakh, defended its interests, 
strengthened its presence in the South Caucasus’s security 
and relational system, and increased revenues through the 
sale of weapons (International Institute for Strategic Studies 
2010, 1–3). 
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After Medvedev developed a negotiating agenda to resolve 
the conflict with unusual intensity in 2008–2011 (knowing that 
negotiations had been blocked for two decades and that it was 
unlikely that the parties would reach an agreement), Putin 
resumed strategies to maintain a complex balance that 
intensified tensions between the two states, in geo-energy 
terms benefiting Russia. For example, days after Putin 
announced relevant trade agreements with Azerbaijan in 2013 
(questions on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict were avoided), 
Armenia, concerned that Russia would increase the supply of 
arms to Azerbaijan, which has not renounced its military 
occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh, announced its entry into the 
Customs Union of Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan. Thus, Armenia 
forwent its impending Association Agreement with the EU 
(Armenian society largely supported the incorporation of 
Armenia into the Russia-Belarus Union). In December 2013, 
Putin announced a price reduction for gas, petroleum products 
and weaponry supplied to Armenia. 
The conflict resolution protocol of the Minsk Group requires 
that Armenia return the seven districts surrounding Nagorno-
Karabakh to Azerbaijan, allow this territory provisional status 
that ensures its security and self-government, maintain a 
corridor that physically connects Nagorno-Karabakh’s territory 
with Armenia through Azerbaijan, hold a binding referendum 
on its final status, and allow the return of refugees and 
displaced persons. However, Armenia and Azerbaijan do not 
agree on the protocol’s implementation, and so far the only 
advance is that the parties seem to have accepted the 
practical impossibility of resolving the conflict militarily. 
Therefore, Nagorno-Karabakh may: 
 
a) Maintain its current status or a similar status: formally 
Azerbaijani territory but de facto independent and closely 
linked to Armenia. 
b) Become integrated into Armenia. 
c) Become a sovereign state but supervised by Armenia and, 
above all, by Russia. 
d) Return to Azerbaijani sovereignty. 
 
The first scenario is the most favourable for Russia because 
any other outcome would require it to intervene militarily to 
support Armenia against Azerbaijan, where it has many geo-
energy interests. In fact, Russian intervention in the conflict has 
always aimed at maintaining the status quo. Although it is 
unlikely that the parties will reach an agreement, Russia insists 
on resolving the conflict through dialogue and reserves the 
right to intervene militarily if any party employs the use of force 
(as in Georgia). However, as in the conflicts in South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia, Rusetsky (translated from 2012, 65) observes: 
 
Russia is part of the conflict. Although Russia maintains military 
cooperation with Azerbaijan and Armenia at the same time, the 
asymmetry of the conflict is evident (…) both legally and militarily, 
because Armenia is a member of the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization. Additionally, the Russian Federation will be 
interested in regulating the conflict only if it regains complete 
control of the region’s situation. As a party to the conflict, Russia 
cannot play the role of intermediary. Additionally, the Abkhaz 
variant is not excluded, where Russia, being part of the conflict, 
became active and occupied Georgian territory. 
 
2.2.1. Geo-energy Benefits for Russia 
With respect to Azerbaijan, the current scenario allows 
Russia to refrain from antagonising a state that is so critical to 
transportation systems and hydrocarbon reserves (much of 
which are exported through Russian territory) by continuing to 
consider for Azerbaijan the option to regain Nagorno-Karabakh 
and the seven districts. Russia prevents Azerbaijan from 
expanding its relations with Turkey, while Azerbaijan also 
blocks Iranian influence in the South Caucasus. However, 
Russia has also informed Azerbaijan that a conflict resolution 
that favourable to Azerbaijan’s interests will only be possible if 
Azerbaijan does not harm Russian geo-energy interests, for 
example by constructing offshore pipelines in the Caspian Sea. 
Nonetheless, Azerbaijan prefers to exploit its own resources, 
rather than being a transit state for Turkmen gas. 
Azerbaijan’s support of building (primarily by US companies) 
the WREP and BTC oil pipelines caused Russia to reject 
Azerbaijan as a partner (the considerable involvement of 
foreign interests and capital in the Azerbaijani energy sector 
and the desire for political and energy independence explain 
why Azerbaijan uses different export routes). However, Russian 
pressure largely explains why Azerbaijan and the consortium 
that operates Shah Deniz field (including the Russian company 
Lukoil) chose in June 2013 to transport gas to Europe via the 
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TAP in place of the Nabucco West route (the European 
Commission is currently negotiating an agreement with 
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to build an offshore pipeline to 
Europe). Azerbaijan and companies that operate within this 
field hold important interests in Russia, and the TAP project 
was chosen because it will not supply gas to states with high 
dependence on Russian gas. 
In this context of developing Russian-Azerbaijani energy 
relations, , SOCAR and Russia’s Rosneft agreed a joint venture 
in August 2013, and SOCAR announced plans to transport 
Russian oil through the BTC oil pipeline in the near future and 
to reverse the flow of the Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipeline to 
transport Russian oil to Azerbaijan. To the extent that the BTC 
oil pipeline is intended to reduce Europe’s dependence on 
Russian oil and transport routes through Russian territory, this 
could entail a major shift in the geo-energy outlook of the 
South Caucasus. Russia has taken advantage of the fact that 
Azerbaijan’s oil production and revenues have decreased in 
recent years by offering the possibility of capitalising more on 
the transmission of oil through the BTC oil pipeline, which 
would be fed with Russian oil. Russia has also taken 
advantage of decreased activity in Azerbaijani oil refineries by 
offering to provide Russian oil through the Baku-Novorossiysk 
oil pipeline (Stratfor 2013). 
In addition, by keeping the Nagorno-Karabakh, South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia conflicts frozen, Russia has managed to 
sow doubts over the construction of the TAP and other 
pipelines that cross the South Caucasus or those being 
planned that intend to avoid Russian territory, which may 
support military objectives. As already noted, no pipeline 
currently crosses Armenia due to strained Armenian-
Azerbaijani relations, and this also benefits Russian geo-
energy interests. 
With regards to Armenia, by maintaining the current status 
of Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia has managed to maintain a 
historical ally while also distancing it from the EU, because 
although Russia does not explicitly support the formal 
independence of Nagorno-Karabakh or its annexation by 
Armenia, it tolerates the de facto independence of 
secessionist, pro-Armenian territory as well as Armenian 
control over the seven Azerbaijani districts. However, for the 
reasons stated, throughout the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
Russia has not positioned itself against Azerbaijan as Armenia 
wished, though Armenia must remain loyal to Russia to 
continue to exist as a state. In addition, like Azerbaijan, Russia 
has informed Armenia that a conflict resolution strategy 
favourable to Armenian interests will only be possible if 
Armenia does not infringe upon Russian geo-energy interests. 
Russia has even managed to involve Armenia in the Russian-
Georgian conflict, which has been intensified by the existence 
of the Gyumri military base near Georgia. 
Russian pressures have prevented Iranian-Armenian 
negotiations on hydrocarbons from prospering (Russian troops 
closely monitor gas pipelines connecting Armenia with Iran). 
Russia has also ensured that Armenia will continue to buy 
virtually all of its gas and oil from Russia. From 2014 to 2018, 
Russia will supply Armenia with 2.5 billion cm annually, 
representing approximately 350 million euros per year despite 
price reductions in 2013. In January 2014, Gazprom acquired 
100 percent of the shares of its Armenian equivalent, 
ArmRosgazprom (created in 1997), which was renamed 
Gazprom Armenia (Gazprom had acquired 80 percent in 
2006). Russia holds considerable geo-energy interests in 
Armenia’s current and future participation in gas transportation 
projects and infrastructure, electricity generation and the use 
of natural gas vehicles. The latter sector is well developed in 
Armenia. Additionally, Gazprom owns Armenia’s gas 
transportation system. 
Finally, by maintaining the present conditions in the territory 
of Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia has managed to maintain an ally 
in the South Caucasus. Although Russia has not recognised 
Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state or expressly 
supported its annexation by Armenia, Russia tolerates its 
current de facto independence. At the same time, Russia has 
also conveyed to authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh that a 
resolution of the conflict that is favourable to the region’s 
interests (becoming a sovereign state or joining Armenia, 
which would both entail dependence on Russia) will only be 
possible if they do not infringe upon Russian geo-energy 
interests. 
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3. Conclusions 
The present article illustrates the direct and clear connection 
between Russia’s intervention in the three conflicts and the 
defence of Russian geo-energy interests in the post-Soviet era, 
especially since Putin’s rise to power. Interventions in South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia, especially those following the 2008 
war, have allowed Russia to consolidate and intensify its 
presence in Georgia, which is positioned as a strategic energy 
corridor from the South Caucasus and which presents the only 
alternative to the Russian pipeline system for oil transport from 
the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. After the war, Russia 
acquired complete control over the Abkhaz coast to strengthen 
its already massive presence in the Black Sea, to control 
hydrocarbon transport and the Abkhaz continental shelf and 
gas fields, and to obtain considerable income by signing 
energy contracts. Russia has strengthened the Black Sea 
region in order to control strategic regional pipelines to the 
detriment of the Caspian Sea area and to block access to the 
Black Sea. 
Russia closely monitors pipelines connecting Azerbaijan with 
the rest of the South Caucasus and with Russia itself, and has 
prevented the development of new pipelines that would cross 
the South Caucasus while avoiding Russian territory (Russia 
has caused Kazakhstan to cancel major investments in 
Georgian energy infrastructure) as well as the planning of new 
pipelines avoiding Russian territory that would connect Central 
Asia with the South Caucasus, and the South Caucasus with 
Europe. 
Equally to the detriment of the Caspian Sea region, Russia 
has also increased the significance of the Black Sea as energy 
corridor while enhancing the South Stream project. Thus, 
Russia prevails as the main transit route for current and future 
pipelines, contradicting Western desires for importation routes 
avoiding Russian to reduce dependency. 
In addition, Russia has limited relations between the South 
Caucasus and NATO, and Georgia could only join NATO if it 
renounced sovereignty over South Ossetia and Abkhazia (one-
sixth of its territory) and accepted defeat. Additionally, with the 
2008 war, Russia warned states with territorial tensions in its 
sphere of influence that approaching the EU or NATO could 
harm Russian geo-energy interests. Additionally, by 
recognising South Ossetia and Abkhazia as sovereign states, 
Russia warned Armenia and Azerbaijan that the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict will follow the Russian road map. In 
particular, Russia warned Azerbaijan that Russia could 
recognise the sovereignty of Nagorno-Karabakh. 
The current conditions of the conflict significantly favour 
Russia, and Russian intervention has always sought to 
maintain this arrangement. Although it is unlikely that the 
parties will reach an agreement, Russia insists on resolving 
conflicts through dialogue and reserves the right to intervene 
militarily. 
With respect to Azerbaijan, the current scenario allows 
Russia to refrain from antagonising a highly strategic state with 
respect to energy policy by maintaining for Azerbaijan the 
option of regaining Nagorno-Karabakh and the seven districts. 
However, Russia has simultaneously informed Azerbaijan that 
a conflict resolution favourable to Azerbaijan’s interests will 
only be possible if Azerbaijan does not harm Russian geo-
energy interests. 
While Azerbaijan’s support for the building of the WREP and 
BTC oil pipelines caused Russia to reject Azerbaijan as a 
partner, Russian pressure largely explained why Azerbaijan and 
the consortium that operates the Shah Deniz field chose the 
TAP for gas transport to Europe in 2013. In the current context 
of developing Russian-Azerbaijani energy relations, SOCAR 
and Russia’s Rosneft signed a joint venture in 2013, and 
SOCAR announced plans to transport Russian oil through the 
BTC oil pipeline in the near future and to reverse the flow of 
the Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipeline to send Russian oil to 
Azerbaijan. This could imply a major shift in the geo-energy 
outlook of the South Caucasus. 
In addition, in keeping the Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia conflicts frozen, Russia has managed to sow 
doubts ovedr the future of TAP and other existing or proposed 
pipelines that intend to cross the South Caucasus while 
avoiding Russian territory, which may represent military 
targets. No pipeline currently crosses Armenia due to strained 
Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, and this benefits Russian geo-
energy interests. 
With respect to Armenia, by maintaining the present 
conditions in Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia has retained a 
IJCV: Vol. 11#03/2017 
Peña-Ramos: The Impact of Russian Intervention in Post-Soviet Secessionist Conflict in the South Caucasus on Russian Geo-energy Interests 12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
historical ally while limiting the region’s relations with the EU. 
Although Russia does not explicitly support the formal 
independence of Nagorno-Karabakh or its annexation by 
Armenia, it tolerates the territory’s de facto independence and 
Armenian control over the seven Azerbaijani districts. However, 
Russia has not positioned itself against Azerbaijan, in which 
Russia holds a strategic interest in geo-energy terms. In 
addition, as it did with Azerbaijan, Russia informed Armenia 
that a conflict resolution agreement favourable to Armenian 
interests will only be possible if Armenia does not harm 
Russian geo-energy interests. 
Thus, Russian pressure has prevented Iranian-Armenian 
negotiations on hydrocarbons from progressing. Russia has 
also ensured that Armenia will continue to buy virtually all of 
its gas and oil supplies from Russia, generating significant 
revenue. In 2006, Gazprom acquired 80 percent of the shares 
of its Armenian equivalent, ArmRosgazprom, and in 2014 
purchased the remaining 20 percent. Russia holds significant 
geo-energy interests in Armenia’s current and future 
participation in gas transportation projects and transport, 
electricity generation and the use of NGVs. Gazprom owns the 
Armenian gas transportation system, and Russia has even 
managed to involve Armenia in some way in the Russian-
Georgian conflict, enhancing the Gyumri military base. 
Finally, concerning the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, by 
maintaining the present scenario, Russia has managed to 
acquire another ally within the South Caucasus. Although 
Russia has not recognised the territory as an independent state 
or expressly supported its annexation by Armenia, Russia 
tolerates its current de facto independence. At the same time, 
Russia has also conveyed to the authorities of Nagorno-
Karabakh that a conflict resolution agreement favourable to 
the territory’s interests (becoming a sovereign state or 
incorporation into Armenia) will only be possible if it does not 
harm Russian geo-energy interests. 
Azerbaijan, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh are aware that 
the evolution of these conditions will primarily be determined 
by Russia. All three are forced to adhere to Russia’s interests 
if they wish for Russia to attend to their conflicting interests. 
We therefore conclude that Russia’s interventions in the 
three post-Soviet secessionist conflicts in the South Caucasus 
have greatly benefited Russian geo-energy interests. 
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